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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are seventy years old. Your hair is grey, your glasses
are thick, and you have some trouble hearing when people speak to you.
You need help standing up and going to the bathroom, you stumble
because your vision has deteriorated, and you can’t remember if you took
all of your medications this morning. Now imagine having to live this out
in prison. You do not have the comfort of someone who can help you to
the bathroom. You are afraid to bump into other prisoners for fear of
altercation and you have become an easy target for the younger inmates.
You are afraid every day and require medical attention that you just do not
get. Your brain does not work like it used to. Sometimes you wander into
areas you should not be in, and you get in trouble with the guards–finding
yourself in even worse conditions, in solitary confinement.
Prisons are not meant to be nice or comfortable, but they are meant
to have appropriate accommodations for prisoners who need certain
arrangements or attention in order to function and live their everyday lives.
There are avenues where prisoners can redress their grievances for some
of the inequities they face in prisons and there are alternatives to long,
painful sentences. However, it is rare to be granted relief from the
hardships of prison and there is very little compassion for those older
prisoners who are suffering because they cannot be accommodated.
Elderly prisoners present unique circumstances that set them apart from
other prisoners. Their needs are specific and encapsulate the realms of
mental and physical disabilities.
Elderly prisoners present the issue of dealing with later-in-life
diseases such as dementia, deteriorating mental faculties, loss of vision
and hearing, loss of mobility, the increased need for medications and
doctor visits, diminished motor skills, incontinence, chronic illnesses,
terminal illnesses, and an increased susceptibility to other health issues
such as pneumonia and the flu. 1 These prisoners did not necessarily come
in with these disabilities; they developed them over the course of their
sentence. It is easy to sentence someone to life in prison and send them
away to spend their lives in a jail cell, but these people don’t just go away.
They may be forgotten by the judicial system because their cases are over,
but they still have constitutional rights that need to be protected. The main
constitutional issue presented here is one concerning the Eighth
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment. 2
Vernon Madison, an inmate in Alabama who was sentenced to
death after being convicted of murdering a police officer in 1985, is
Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Saftey Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release For
Elderly Inmates, 43 Stetson L. Rev. 197 at 204-05 (2013).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
1
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currently facing being impacted by this exact constitutional issue. 3 Since
being convicted, Madison has suffered two strokes and has developed
dementia, along with other health issues 4 Madison no longer remembers
his crime or why he is in prison. 5 The issue of whether it is constitutional
to execute Mr. Madison – someone who does not remember his crime – or
if it is considered cruel and unusual punishment, has reached the Supreme
Court. 6 In this case, the Court held that in order to satisfy the standard of
mental incapacity sufficient to stay an execution, the individual must be
unable to rationally understand why the state wants to execute him. 7 The
Court ultimately felt that while memory loss or mental incapacity in itself
may not always be enough to stay an execution, Madison’s specific case
deserved a second look due to his inability to understand his punishment
– as such, the case was vacated and remanded.8 Additionally, there is the
underlying issue of whether keeping a prisoner in prison who is feeble and
infirmed is, itself, cruel and unusual punishment. Perhaps compassionate
release could ease some of these issues, but this has been widely debated
and highly controversial in recent years. There are policy issues
concerning general deterrence of criminals and punishment of the
individual for their specific crime. While having an individual serve their
entire sentence benefits society from a penological standpoint, the effect
on the individual is diminished, or altogether lost, when they have a
decreased capacity to understand or there is unnecessarily increased
suffering imposed on older prisoners.
This note will address the topic of elderly prisoners and how they
are marginalized in the prison system. Part 1 will discuss the
aforementioned case of Madison v. Alabama 9, including the facts of the
case, the procedural posture, implications of the ruling and the policy and
societal issues at stake in the case regarding the punishment of elderly
prisoners. Part II will discuss incarceration rates of individuals who are
arrested later in life and “older criminals” who are coming into the prison
system. Part II will also discuss the prevalence of prisoners who are
growing old in prison, and how the environment and their needs have
changed over time. Part III will discuss the judicial response to elderly
Deborah Barfield Berry, Bryan Lyman, & Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Hears
Arguments Over Death Row Inmate With Dementia, Montgomery Advertiser (Oct. 2, 2018,
3:25 PM), https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics/2018/10/02/u-ssupreme-court-hears-argument-alabama-execution-case/1501109002/
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 726.
8 Id. at 727-28.
9 See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).
3
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prisoner issues, prior decisions on compassionate release, and how older
prisoners seeking alternative methods of punishment are handled in the
judicial system. Part IV will analyze the implications of Madison v.
Alabama, as well as possible solutions to the issue of elderly prisoners and
lack of accommodations in general. 10 Part V will conclude the note with a
summary of the issues presented and discuss the constitutional and
individual rights implicated in the context of the Eighth Amendment and
in the context of the Madison v. Alabama decision. 11

II.

MADISON’S SUPREME COURT PETITION

The case of Madison v. Alabama involves a man named Vernon
Madison, who was convicted and sentenced to death for killing a police
officer in Mobile, Alabama. 12 His crime was committed in 1985 and after
three separate trials and exhausting the appeals process, Madison’s case
made it to the Supreme Court. 13 However, during Madison’s thirty years
in prison, he suffered two strokes and was known to have suffered from
mental health issues. 14 Due to vascular dementia, he claimed he could no
longer remember committing his crime, he could not remember the
victim’s name, or his previous trials. 15 The issue in the Supreme Court
appeal was “whether a ‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental
illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of the ‘State’s rationale for
his execution.’” 16
Madison argued that he met the standard set to determine
incompetency that would render his execution unlawful, which is
“whether a ‘prisoner’s concept of reality’ is ‘so impair[ed]’ that he cannot
grasp the ‘execution’s meaning and purpose’ or the ‘link between [his]
crime and its punishment.’” 17 He asserted that his multiple strokes and
vascular dementia interfered with his ability to understand and
comprehend his execution. 18 Additionally, Madison argued there should
be wider protection and an expanded legal standard under the Eighth
Amendment to broaden the scope of mental disorders allowed for

10

Id.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12 Lauren Davendorf & Luis L. Lozada, Madison v. State of Alabama, LEGAL INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-7505 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2019).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 722.
11
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incompetence. 19 The Eighth Amendment guards against cruel and unusual
punishment, and Madison argued that executing him with his diminished
capacity to understand his surroundings and circumstances would violate
his constitutional rights and infringe on his Eighth Amendment
protections. 20
The state of Alabama, on the other hand, argued that the defendant
should be executed if he can “rationally understand his punishment and if
this understanding mirrors the general communities’ understanding of
these concepts.” 21 The State contended that since he renounces his
punishment, he must have an understanding of how crime and punishment
fit together. 22 The State also had concerns about the implications of
expanding the incompetency standards.23 There is a fear that expanding
the standard to be more inclusive of mental disorders would incentivize
prisoners to claim mental deficiency to reduce or escape their sentence,
and that this would make it easier for these prisoners to obtain a stay from
execution or lighter sentences. 24 The State cited studies that have shown
the average age of prisoners on death row has increased and thus the
likelihood of prisoners claiming incompetency on death row would
increase with the more lenient standards for determining incompetency. 25
Further, the State contended that Madison’s memory disorder should not
exempt him from execution under the Eighth Amendment.26 To further
this argument, the State pointed out that no law has been passed by any
state to prohibit execution of a defendant suffering from memory loss or
who does not remember their crime. 27 It is important to note that the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association have recommended that no defendant with a severe mental
disorder be executed; however, the state argued that this has not
traditionally been followed in the judicial system. 28 The ultimate argument
by the State is that this execution of a man who has vascular dementia and
has suffered multiple strokes would not violate standards of decency set
forth by the Eighth Amendment. 29
The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO)
supported the State’s case, advocating to continue the trend of stricter
Id. at 723-25; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Davendorf, supra note 12, U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
21 Davendorf, supra note 12.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19
20
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penalties for crimes against police officers. 30 Recently, the Protect and
Serve Act was passed to make criminal sanctions for crimes against police
more severe and to give police the same protections as those who are
victims of hate crimes. 31 NAPO has previously stated that dementia or
memory loss does not make a defendant less responsible for the murder he
committed and that the memory loss does not matter and, in effect, should
not even be taken into consideration. 32
These two opposing arguments are only one facet of the issues
elderly prisoners face, especially those facing life sentences or the death
penalty. For example, another issue which often comes up in this context
is the importance of general deterrence versus that of punishing the
individual and bringing justice for a particular victim and their family.
Executing a person with severe mental deterioration would not serve to
further general deterrence–the punishment is too harsh for society to
condone, even though it would deter criminals from committing heinous
crimes in fear of a similar fate as Madison. Individual (specific) deterrence
is not served either. In Madison’s case, he has served 30 years in prison,
spending a majority of his time in solitary confinement; he had suffered
two strokes, has severe memory loss, and continues to serve his sentence
for a crime he does not remember. 33 Executing Madison would not serve
to deter him from future crime, since he does not know why he is being
executed nor the crime that got him in jail in the first place. 34 It may, of
course, provide closure or a sense that justice has been served to the family
of Madison’s particular victim – as such, depending on which of these
purported purposes of criminal law and punishment one finds to be more
persuasive, one may or may not find Madison’s execution to serve a
justifiable purpose at all.
The implications of the Madison decision will have a lasting
impact on the criminal justice system. This opinion will echo throughout
prisons all over the country. In Ford v. Wainwright, 35 the court held that
executing the incompetent is unconstitutional because the retributive and
deterrent goals of the death penalty are not served by punishing someone
who does not understand, or who is not aware, of his punishment nor the

30 Lauren Devendorf, Luís L. Losada, Madison v. State of Alabama, Cornell Law School
Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-7505.
31 Emanuella Grinberg, New Bill Offers Police Officers Protections Similar to Those For
Hate Crime Victims, CNN (May 8, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics
/protect-and-serve-act/index.html.
32 Devendorf, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986).
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reason for his punishment. Furthering this holding is Atkins v. Virginia,36
which ruled the execution of the “mentally retarded” is unconstitutional
due to the lack of culpability in relation to the severity of the punishment.
However, Allen v. Ornoski 37 holds that limits on the death penalty set by
the Supreme Court are grounded in the fact that some people, such as
minors, are less culpable than others, but old age and infirmity do not
render an individual less culpable at the time of the offense. These cases
exemplify the split between the courts when deciding this issue and set a
powerful foundation for the forthcoming decision.

III.

GROWING OLD IN PRISON AND OTHER OPTIONS

In general, when society thinks of criminals and prisoners, young
people come to mind. 38 However, the reality is that prisons are populated
by a mix of old and young prisoners. 39 Elderly prisoners make up eight
percent of the national state prison population. 40 This means that 8,354
prisoners in state prisons are over the age of fifty. 41 It is predicted that by
the year 2030, one-third of the prison population will be over the age of
fifty. 42 Over the last two decades, the older inmate population has
increased by 750% nationwide. 43 This will continue to increase the costs
to incarcerate these individuals, as the average elderly prisoner is affected
by around three chronic illnesses requiring medical attention and those not
affected by illness still need help navigating their daily lives in prison. 44
Young men and women who enter the prison system age as their sentences
pass, and these young offenders are now older men and women who are
adjusting to a different type of life in prison.
It is not only young offenders who enter the prison system,
however. 45 Older individuals do commit crimes and enter the prison
system already as members of the senior population. 46 Since these
offenders are older, they are more likely to get lengthier sentences, thus
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006).
38 Gennaro F. Vito, Deborah G. Wilson, Forgotten People: Elderly Inmates, 49 FED. PROB.
18 (1985).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Casey N. Ferri, Comment, A Stuck Safety Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate
Release For Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197 (2014).
43 See William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 855 (2009).
44 Ferri, supra note 42.
45 Id. at 200.
46 Id.
36
37
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creating a greater likelihood they will age through the system.47 It has been
shown that the amount of elderly criminals is increasing. 48 Crime is not
limited to those who are young, and society often forgets or neglects to
think about these older offenders. 49 Older offenders experience unique
issues in prison and in the judicial system, which can include adjusting to
prison, being more vulnerable to victimization (by both other prisoners
and prison staff, including guards) once imprisoned, learning to live in the
limited physical space prisons provide, having limited access to programs,
and dealing with the diversity of ages in the prison populations. 50 Most
prison programs were designed for young offenders and do not take into
account the elderly. 51
With a 0.01% release rate, many of these elderly prisoners are left
to serve their entire sentences without any sort of compassionate release
or special accommodations for special needs that may arise. 52 There has
been much conversation on the topic of compassionate release, with an
underwhelming amount of action taken on the subject. 53 Compassionate
release is defined as when the court chooses to terminate or reduce a
prisoner’s sentence when that prisoner meets a set of stringent criteria set
forth in a federal statute. 54 While this may sound beneficial, particularly to
elderly prisoners, compassionate release programs “ . . . simply do[] not
reach enough inmates to make a tangible difference.” 55 In 1984, Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which called for the adoption
of a sentencing commission who would create mandatory sentencing
guidelines for federal judges. 56 In this act, there are safety-valve provisions
aimed at avoiding injustice. 57 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c) allows for modification
of sentences under certain conditions. 58 This provides that one way of
modifying a sentence would be to show a finding of “extraordinary and
compelling reasons to warrant a reduction, or the defendant is at least
seventy years of age, has served at least thirty years in prison and the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons determines the individual is not a danger
to society or to anyone’s safety. 59
Id. at 201.
Gennaro, supra note 38.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 19
52 Ferri, supra note 42 at 198.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Berry, supra note 43.
57 Id. at 859.
58 Id.
59 Id.
47
48
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Only recently did the United States Sentencing Commission
modify their guidelines to explain what “extraordinary and compelling”
means. 60 This new commentary provided that extraordinary and
compelling can “include terminal illness, debilitating physical illness that
prevents self-care, and death or incapacitation of the only family member
able to care for a child.” 61 This list is not exhaustive and the Commission
had provided that other extraordinary and compelling circumstances may
warrant compassionate release. 62 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Report on the SRA explains the purpose behind the safety-valve provision
as such:
“The Committee believes that there may be unusual cases
in which an eventual reduction in the length of a term of
imprisonment is justified by changed circumstances.
These would include cases of severe illness, cases in
which other extraordinary and compelling circumstances
justify a reduction of an unusually long sentence, and
some cases in which the sentencing guidelines for the
offense of which the defend [ant] was convicted have
been later amended to provide a shorter term of
imprisonment.” 63
Conversely, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has said that any
extraordinary and compelling events giving rise to compassionate release
need to have been reasonably unforeseen at the time of the sentencing. 64
The interpretation of this provision has usually meant that the inmate is
terminally ill or near death. 65 However, it is hard to figure out what would
be foreseeable and what would not, which is why the Director of the BOP
has scarcely used his discretion to file motions for release. 66
The meaning and application of “extraordinary and compelling”
within the compassionate release context is at the heart of the Madison v.
Alabama case. 67 Madison argues it is extraordinary and compelling to
release a man in his situation –a man far removed from his former self.68
It is absurd, Madison argues, to punish the man that he is today, when he
cannot even recall the man who he once was, who committed this crime.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 853.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 860.
64 Id. at 862.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 863.
67 Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).
68 Devendorf, supra note 30.
60
61
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The State argues that he has not been punished enough, and that the family
of the deceased police officer deserves for Madison’s sentence to be fully
executed – in every sense of the word – in order to bring about justice. 69
So how does one reconcile what morally would be “extraordinary and
compelling,” but statutorily may miss the mark?

IV.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Jurisdictions and courts have widely varied in their rulings on
reducing sentences, especially when it comes to capital punishment. With
a controversial topic such as this one, it is no surprise that the courts have
been split on how to handle this issue, which makes the ultimate decision
of Madison v. Alabama by the Supreme Court that much more impactful.
The Madison decision will have a lasting impact on prisoner rights, elderly
prisoner accommodations and programs, and will shape the future of
compassionate release. The Eighth Amendment is implicated in the
question of whether it is cruel and unusual to keep older prisoners
incarcerated through their older age, and if prisoners set to be executed
should be executed even withstanding any ailments, infirmities or
disabilities they have obtained over their years in prison.
To start, the Eighth Amendment protects against, among other
things, cruel and unusual punishment. 70 “The Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment . . . limits the power of
the legislative body to establish penalties for crimes, restricts the courts
when sentencing convicted defendants, and protects prisoners from excess
of prison authorities in the Executive Branch.” 71 Rhodes v. Robinson
defines the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting the “wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain upon persons in custody.” 72 “The test of
cruel and unusual punishment considers whether the infliction grossly
exceeds the legitimate need for force and violates the standards of
contemporary society.” 73 To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, conduct
must be more egregious than that sufficient to establish a common law
tort. 74 The Eighth Amendment specifically provides that there should not
be excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. 75
69

Id.
Id.
71 Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3rd Cir. 1983).
72 Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766 at 771 (3rd Cir., Dec. 28, 1979).
73 Id.
74 Mussomelli, 722 F.2d at 1132.
75 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
70
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The Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia ruled that capital
punishment for the crime of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. 76 Because the punishment must generally
fit the crime committed, courts have ruled that capital punishment is most
acceptable in situations of murder because the offender deliberately took
another’s life. 77 However, courts have ruled that capital punishment for
the crime of murder can still be considered unconstitutional in certain
cases. 78
For example, in Ford v. Wainwright, the Court ruled that it was
unconstitutional to execute someone who is incompetent, the rationale for
this being that the deterrent affect is not served by executing someone who
does not understand the crime, their punishment, or their trial.79 This Court
noted that an evidentiary hearing to determine the mental capacity of the
individual is required and the proper procedural safeguards, such as having
an attorney and a fair trial, were necessary.80 Additionally, in Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court held that it is unconstitutional to execute a “mentally
retarded” individual. 81 The Court noted that while their mental capacity
does not exempt them from criminal sanctions, it is unconstitutional to
execute them due to a lesser degree of understanding and awareness. 82
Following this, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court ruled that when imposing the
death penalty, the jury should be allowed to consider mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, including the individual’s character. 83 The
Court held that once a prisoner is sentenced to the death penalty, the
sentence must be imposed unless:
When considering the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history, character, and condition of the
offender, the sentencing judge determines that at least one
of the following mitigating circumstances is established
by the preponderance of the evidence. . . that the offense
was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or
mental deficiency. 84
This holds that a person’s mental condition at the time of the
offense affects their ability to be sentenced to death, and when read in the
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
Id. at 203.
78 Id. at 174.
79 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
80 Id. at 410.
81 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
82 Id. at 318.
83 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978).
84 Id. at 593-94.
76
77
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context of other death penalty cases, this provides that a person’s lack of
mental capacity can render them unable to be executed, period, as doing
so would violate the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and
unusual punishment. 85 Regardless of whether the person is incapacitated
at the time of the crime, the time of the trial, or at the time of their
execution, the precedent holds that capital punishment of someone who
has lessened mental faculties is cruel and unusual and cannot be done
without offending the constitution. 86
However, there are issues with the cases cited above where great
ambiguity lies. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court never provided a viable
guideline on how to determine if a person claiming mental incapacity falls
within the protection of the Eighth Amendment.87 In Hall v. Florida, the
Court held that a man whose IQ was seventy-one, rather than seventy or
below, which Florida proscribed was the cutoff for intellectual disability,
was allowed to present evidence of his intellectual disability before being
sentenced to death. 88 The Court noted that an objective standard, such as
an IQ test, for determining intellectual disability was not enough to ensure
a fair process; however, subjective components make the process complex
as well. 89 This is to say there is no one-size-fits-all category of mental
illness or developmental delay that renders someone exempt from
execution.
Conversely, courts have ruled that old age and infirmity do not
render the individual less culpable at the time of the offense. 90 In Allen v.
Ornoski, a prisoner, who was blind, old, and infirmed, had been on death
row for murder for twenty-three years. 91 The court held that his physical
infirmity had nothing to do with his mental state at the time of the crime
nor did it affect his ability to understand why he was being executed. 92 The
Court found that the execution of the elderly and the infirm generally had
no legal support and could not be sustained in this case. 93 The prosecution
in these cases often argues that the retributive and penological purposes
served by the death penalty are still served and there is a strong deterrent
effect on those who are thinking of committing similar crimes, as long as
the individual who is being executed understands the nature of why they

See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
536 U.S. at 304.
87 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 718 (2014); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304.
88 Hall, 572 U.S. at 724.
89 Id. at 724.
90 Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir., 2006).
91 Id. at 949.
92 Id. at 952.
93 Id. at 954.
85
86
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are being executed. 94 Courts have also ruled that spending a significant
amount of time on death row in harsh conditions does not render someone
unable to be executed. 95
This brings up the issue of treatment of older prisoners in the
prison system and the lack of options for those suffering in prison. As
Ornoski prescribes, elderly prisoners can be executed as long as their
mental state is not affected and they understand why they are being
executed. 96 However, the rationale in Ornoski and other death penalty
jurisprudence does not consider what, if any, avenues of relief are
available for elderly prisoners who are not on death row, necessarily.
Courts have also ruled on the imposition of alternative punishments, such
as compassionate release and other means of alleviating the unusual and
cruel conditions elderly prisoners face that are not on death row. As stated
above, the standard for extraordinary and compelling are circumstances
not foreseen at the time of sentencing, and can include terminal illness,
debilitating physical illness that prevents self-care, and death or
incapacitation of the only family member able to care for a child, but this
list is not exhaustive. 97 Additionally, compassionate release can only be
granted upon a motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 98
The case of United States v. Dimasi held that the reduction of an
inmate’s sentence from eight to five years was warranted even though
there was no terminal illness, because the defendant met the criteria to be
considered an elderly prisoner with “extraordinary and compelling”
circumstances due to a high level of care and services that he required that
could not be afforded to him in prison. 99 However, in the case United
States v. Dresbach, a man with a terminal illness, whose wife and child
also suffered from health issues, was denied compassionate release
because the Director of the Bureau of Prisons had exercised its discretion
in reviewing the case and had given a reasonable basis for the denial of the
inmate’s request. 100 The Court acknowledged that while there are medical
Id. at 953; Garrett Epps, The Machinery of Death is Back on the Docket, (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/tinkering-with-the-machinery-ofdeath/570421/ (describing the State of Alabama’s focus on the retributive effect of capital
punishment and their goal to maintain Madison’s sentence as long as he knows why he is
being punished).
95 See generally Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
96 See Ornoski, 435 F.3d at 951-52.
97 Berry, supra note 43, at 863; see also Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Saftey Valve: The
Inadequacy of Compassionate Release For Elderly Inmates, 43 Stetson L. Rev. 197 at 20405 (2013)..
98 Berry, supra note 43, at 863.; United States v. Lagonia, No. 09-65, 2012 US Dist. LEXIS
21613, at *3 (D. N.J. Feb. 21, 2012).
99 See United States v. Dimasi, 220 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Mass. 2016).
100 United States v. Dresbach, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1042 (E.D. Mich 2011).
94
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and non-medical reasons for compassionate release, the BOP had properly
used its discretion in denying the request. 101 Additionally, courts have held
that even terminal illness does not warrant compassionate release, arguing
that the Eighth Amendment does not require release of a terminally ill
individual. 102 The juxtaposition of these two cases shows that
compassionate release is an inadequate remedy to the unique issues faced
by elderly prisoners, in large part because of the vast discretion that the
BOP – and, in turn, courts – have in granting or denying it. Indeed, as long
as the BOP has followed their procedure and the sentence does not offend
the Eighth Amendment’s protection of cruel and unusual punishment, a
denial of compassionate release will be upheld by courts. 103

V.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The finality of the death penalty is not the problem in Madison v.
Alabama, nor is it an issue of the punishment fitting the crime. The
problem is whether it is constitutionally acceptable to execute a man who
has suffered severe health issues, who no longer remembers his crime and
who is, for all intents and purposes, no longer the same person who
committed the crime. 104 Madison has suffered multiple strokes, is legally
blind, and can no longer recite the alphabet or rephrase a sentence.105 He
also requires assistance walking and using the restroom. 106 Taking these
things into account, it is difficult to argue that it is constitutional to utilize
such harsh and irreversible punishments as the death penalty as a viable
method of fulfilling the goals of criminal law and punishment. If these
individuals cannot or should not be executed, that of course begs the
question of what should be done with them – that question can be simply
answered in one of two ways: to keep Madison (and others like him) in
prison, or to set him free via compassionate release.
As stated above, the concept of compassionate release is hard to
obtain and there are little other alternatives for elderly prisoners in similar
cases where the punishment may be on the brink of being cruel and
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unusual. 107 One possible solution would be to reform and completely redo
the compassionate release standards and guidelines. This would make
compassionate release a more accessible tool for prisoners who fit the
criteria, rather than making the process so cumbersome with little result or
progress for the inmate. There are stories where inmates have not been
released in time to see their loved ones pass, even though they were set to
be released in a few months. 108 It seems that executing a man with no
memory of his crime in a dire health condition would implicate a similar
sort of compelling circumstance. Madison was set to be executed on
January 25, 2018; however, this did not happen. 109 Upon review, Madison
was ruled incompetent to be executed, but in the same month was cleared
and his execution was reinstated. 110 Madison’s counsel placed emphasis
on the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, relying on the decision of Ford v. Wainwright stating that it
is cruel and unusual punishment to execute a man with severe cognitive
dysfunction with memory loss and a lack of understanding as to the
conditions of his execution. 111 This seems to be another example where an
inmate is not able to present evidence of their incapacity, or where it is
merely ignored. 112
Hearings such as this one are incredibly hard to navigate. An
overhaul of the concept of compassionate release would make the process
Madison is going through more streamlined and accessible by providing
clear guidelines to assess the individual circumstances of each case. With
more clarity, comes more availability and uniformity across the judicial
system. The Commission has tried to define the “extraordinary and
compelling” standards that warrant a motion for release, but the
application has been messy and inconsistent. 113
The State argued that to expand the standard for mental illness in
this way leaves the door open to abuse of the system. 114 The State urged
that following the Ford ruling would incentivize defendants to claim
mental illness as a scapegoat to avoid execution.115 The State argued that
Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Safety Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release For
Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197, 198 (2013) (describing the low release rates of
elderly prisoners and the minimal impact of compassionate release on the prison system).
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Madison is fit to be executed because he understands the correlation
between crime and punishment and knows he is being punished for
committing a crime. 116 Additionally, the State argues that since he insists
his punishment is unfair, he is fit to understand what is happening and why
it is happening. 117 The State contends that Madison is suffering from a
memory disorder and this does not fall under the category of mental
illness, which would allow him to escape his sentence using a one-sizefits-all approach. 118 However, the State’s one-size-fits-all approach is not
the answer.
As Madison contended, there are a variety of mental illnesses,
some we know more about and some we know less about. 119 This does not
change the fact that it is inhumane to execute someone who is experiencing
mental illness. The Hall v. Florida decision strikes an important chord by
stating that while the Ford decision may be extreme and all encompassing,
it is important to review each case at a microscopic and individual level
before signing off that someone is or is not fit for execution. 120 Taking this
concept a step further, another solution could be to impose mandatory
mental competency hearings upon receipt of petitions for compassionate
release, especially in capital cases. 121 This would be a thorough way for
the courts to look at each case and each individual to decide the appropriate
course of action to level the playing field for everyone involved. 122
Arbitrary decisions based on a piece of paper do not seem to be furthering
justice here. However, this proposal is not perfect as it would likely lead
to an influx in petitions from inmates wanting to be examined, thus
flooding the already crowded courtrooms.
Another possible solution would be to take a totality of the
circumstances approach, rather than just looking at the individual and their
current mental deficiencies. This approach would include looking at the
crime and everything that happened afterward, including the prisoner’s life
inside the prison system and health conditions. Madison has a host of
issues, not limited to his memory loss. He has suffered severe health issues
and has served the majority of his time in solitary confinement, which has
been proven to cause serious mental health issues for inmates. 123 Courts
116
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should look at the whole picture, rather than focusing on trying to fit the
individual into a box that they feel encompasses their version of mental
health or mental incapacity.
It is important to keep in mind that just as much as the punishment
must fit the crime, the punishment should also fit the person. It is important
to make sure that the identity of the offender and the identity of the inmate
up for execution are the same. Madison is no longer the same man who
committed his heinous crime. Throughout the years, at the consequence of
medical and psychological issues, he has transformed into someone far
removed from the offender he came into prison as. There are situations
with older prisoners who are not on death row where keeping the inmate
incarcerated no longer fits the crime. People are able to be reformed, and
incarceration may no longer serve a purpose, other than keeping someone
locked up for the sake of locking them up. This is true when the individual
is suffering through prison life and could be let out to a medical facility or
a more accessible place for them to be.
There are viable options for older prisoners who no longer belong
in harsh prison environments. Besides parole and probation, taking
prisoners who belong in a medical facility and transferring them to an
alternate permanent residency is another solution. 124 It offends the Eighth
Amendment to keep older people in prison where they lack basic care and
accommodations. Creating a medical facility to keep all of the resources
needed to care for these individuals would lower costs to the state, while
making it easy to accommodate older prisoners without actually releasing
them. 125 This would provide the ability for more targeted services, more
specialized attention, and would eliminate the need for transfer from
location to location. 126 Additionally, these older prisoners would be in a
safer place, away from younger men who serve as a threat to them.127
However, opening the door to releasing older prisoners does bring
about some issues. The courts are often hesitant to grant certain releases
of inmates due to the fear of opening the floodgates. The criteria for being
“old and infirmed” is so broad and can encompass so many different
conditions that it would be hard for the court to differentiate between who
should get released and who is merely trying to shorten their sentence by
claiming they have aged and are uncomfortable in prison, without much
of a compelling basis for being released. As it is, it is hard to determine
who is mentally sound enough to be executed and who is not. It is no
Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Saftey Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release For
Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197 at 210.
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wonder the court has difficulty granting these releases, with such a strict
and somewhat vague criteria to guide them. When you think of the
extraordinary and compelling circumstances test laid out by the
Sentencing Commission, many people could already claim that they have
met this standard. 128 The courts are navigating how far they want to extend
this standard and how feasible they wish to make prison release for older
inmates who may have compelling and justified reasons for being released
early or who wish to be spared from their sentence of capital
punishment. 129 The public also has an interest in enforcing the punishment
to produce a retributive and deterrent effect, which may not happen if these
individuals are released before their sentence is up. 130
There is also the added problem of placing the burden of housing
and caring for these inmates on those out in society. 131 This includes not
only the physical responsibility of caring and looking after these people,
but the enormous financial burden that comes with housing, feeding and
looking after someone. 132 Additionally, any facilities the individual would
need to be placed in, such as medical care or end-of-life care, would need
to be paid for somehow and this burden would likely fall on the state,
leaving taxpayers still paying for these inmates long after they have been
released. 133 To release these prisoners, it is not merely about letting them
out–it is about making sure they are able to sustain themselves once they
are out and that they continue to stay out of trouble.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Aging prisoners are a large group of people who have been
overlooked throughout history and are often inadequately taken care of in
attempts at prison reformation. This group of roughly one third of
prisoners nation-wide are struggling to find their way in their daily lives,
in the prison system, and ultimately out of prison. 134 Compassionate
release is a theory that sounds good on paper, but translates rather poorly
in real life. 135 With a lack of programs for the elderly, in prison and to get
out of prison, this group will continue to be marginalized until real reform
William W. III Berry, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 at 853.
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happens, with an emphasis being on those over fifty. Compassionate
release needs a revamped standard of review to make this idea of releasing
those who no longer need to be in prison or those who have been punished
enough to fit the crime a reality instead of a distant and unattainable ideal.
The Supreme Court showed Madison a modicum of compassion
and ruled that the prisoner must have the ability to understand his
punishment. 136 However, it almost seems as if extraordinary and
compelling is an impossible standard to meet. Madison is a man, who at
one point in his life committed a horrible crime.137 However, his identity
has changed because of various medical conditions and the punishment he
has endured throughout his thirty-plus years in prison. 138 He has remained
in solitary confinement, despite vision loss, memory loss and multiple
strokes. 139 The Supreme Court found the compassionate thing to do was
to release this man, who is no longer mentally the man who committed the
crime, from the burden of his execution. The emphasis in the prison system
should be on punishing the individual, and when the individual is “no
longer there,” then the punishment should be reviewed and potentially
revised.
To kill a man, who does not remember his crime, his trial, the
victim, and maybe even himself, is a merciless killing. It is not to be said
that Madison did not deserve punishment for his crime. A life is a life, and
Madison’s life is not the same after his experience in the prison system.
He wears his punishment of solitary confinement and poor health every
day in prison. His punishment has not been lost on him, even if he has lost
who he is and what he did. The Supreme Court’s ruling has answered
many questions, and the Madison v. Alabama decision will have a lasting
impact on impaired prisoners on death row, older prisoner’s suffering in
prisons, and ultimately it will have the most extraordinary and compelling
impact on the life of Madison himself. 140
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